Intersections: Critical Issues in Education
Volume 3 | Issue 1

Article 6

2019

Constructing a Relevant Contemporary
Philosophy of Education: Explorations of a Freirean
Scholar
Rolf Straubhaar
Texas State University - San Marcos, straubhaar@txstate.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/intersections
Part of the Social and Philosophical Foundations of Education Commons
Recommended Citation
Straubhaar, Rolf. "Constructing a Relevant Contemporary Philosophy of Education: Explorations of a Freirean Scholar." Intersections:
Critical Issues in Education 3, 1 (2019). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/intersections/vol3/iss1/6

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Intersections: Critical Issues in
Education by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact disc@unm.edu.

Intersections: Critical Issues in Education
2019, Vol. 3, No. 1, 44-56

| ESSAY |

Constructing a Relevant Contemporary Philosophy of Education:
Explorations of a Freirean Scholar
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Texas State University - San Marcos

Abstract
Using Paulo Freire’s (2005) theoretical construct of generative themes, this essay
discusses the necessary elements of a relevant contemporary philosophy of education,
drawing on dominant themes in the work of several representative, seminal thinkers:
Rousseau, Wollstonecraft, Dewey, Du Bois, Freire, Morrison and hooks. Each of these
thinkers addresses issues that are quite pertinent to contemporary educational practice,
highlighting the importance and intersectionality of class, race, and gender, alongside the
importance of democracy as both a political ideal and instructional method. The essay
will end with a harmonization of the identified generative themes of each of these thinkers
into the author’s educational philosophy, formalized to be as pertinent as possible to the
issues of today’s classrooms.
Keywords: Class, gender, race, intersectionality
A large part of what has formed us, both as educators and as people, is the writing that
has shaped our thinking. Towards this end, the focus of much undergraduate and graduate
coursework in colleges of education is to lead educators through the personal journey of
developing their own philosophy of education. As an assistant professor working towards
tenure, now working to guide this process with my students in their own coursework, I
have spent a lot of time trying to identify the thinkers that have most influenced me. This
essay represents an attempt at modeling the type of deconstruction of one’s own
influences that I hope to help my students undertake.
In so doing, I am deliberately focusing on a few key figures, those who both represent
significant shifts in educational philosophy writ large and whose work was personally
influential in shaping my own educational philosophy. I have organized it
chronologically, beginning with Enlightenment thinkers such as Jean Jacques Rousseau
(1918) and Mary Wollstonecraft (1891), moving to John Dewey (1921) and his
contributions to the integration of democracy as both educational goal and method. With
W.E.B. Du Bois (1903) and the literary example of Toni Morrison (1970), I explore my
own growing recognition of how marginalized racial groups are not yet being fully
included in Dewey’s idealized democratic society. With my discussion of Paulo Freire
(2005) comes an even fuller recognition of how lower classes and citizens in developing
countries are still marginalized within education, and how education can be used as a
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mechanism to change that unequal reality and bring about a more egalitarian, utopian
society. I will also consider how Freire’s general model of liberation through education,
though limited in Freire’s own conception thereof with regards to race and gender, has
been more fully developed in both areas by thinkers such as bell hooks (1994).
This progression of educational models and ideals of inclusion over time fits closely
with Freire’s (2005) theoretical construct of generative themes—that is, in different time
periods different principles have dominated the conversation within the philosophy of
education. These principles tend to build upon one another, as each new generation of
thinkers recognizes glaring inequalities and gaps in previous philosophers’ thinking and
seek to fill those gaps through their own theoretical writings. While I did not encounter
these thinkers chronologically in this same order, the progression of thinking represented
in their writing here maps well onto the changes in my own thinking over time, and it is
that personal progression that is the focus of this essay. I will explore each philosopher’s
thinking in terms of the dominant generative themes that are addressed, as well as the
blind spots which remain to be filled by future thinkers.
To conclude, I will discuss how I have harmonized the various dominant generative
themes within each of these philosophical thinkers’ work into one philosophy of
education that does its best to recognize all the needs which must be addressed through
contemporary educational practice.

Rousseau
Rousseau (1918) is one of the first modern thinkers to fully address the education of
children in his seminal tome, Emile. While my first encounters with Rousseau in an
undergraduate philosophy course were relatively cursory, primarily focused on his
theories regarding human nature, I delved much more deeply into Emile in graduate
school. At that point, I had already become closely acquainted with the other thinkers I
will discuss in this article, like Freire, Du Bois, hooks and Wollstonecraft. However, it
was in reading Emile that I began to understand how fully Rousseau and other
Enlightenment thinkers had set the foundation epistemologically for how I thought about
the educational process.
For Rousseau, the primary concern of education is that it allows children to develop as
nature intended, avoiding the corruptive elements that are inherent in human society.
Within the first paragraph of his work, Rousseau (1918) powerfully asserts that “man is
born free but is everywhere in chains” (p. 37). Later, Rousseau states more specifically
that it is society that entangles and brings men down—men are, in his words, “enchained
by our institutions” (p. 42). The solution to this predicament, in Rousseau’s eyes, is a
return to the natural state of man, a return to the early innocence of childhood in which
people are inherently free. With regards to the education of children, the paradoxical
challenge to teachers is to allow children to learn and grow without allowing exposure to
fallen human institutions to corrupt them. Rousseau (1918) argues that mothers naturally
know how to care for their children (p. 46), and as such should simply “observe nature
and follow the path it maps out for you” (p. 47). Rousseau similarly argues that the best
way to allow the natural development of children to occur is to educate them in the
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country away from the corrupting societal influences of the city (p. 103); in such a
climate, they can develop their own natural abilities through practical experiences,
learning by doing without being stunted by social pressures (p. 105).
I find Rousseau’s (1918) trust in the innate qualities of people very appealing.
According to him, we are “born sensible” (p. 4), able to learn to speak and be without
being pushed (p. 36), and endowed with reason naturally that will lead us to know good
and evil without any outside help (p. 31). It is a fascinating paradox that Rousseau goes
on at such length about the natural excellence of man, and how education should be
focused primarily on maintaining and keeping connection with that state of nature. Yet his
book is also filled with meticulous comments regarding things that must or must not be
done for a child’s education to be complete (how to be clothed, how to be accustomed to
strange noises or animals, how to become accustomed to firearms and other tools). This
reveals an inherent paradox in Rousseau approach to education: children are naturally
their best selves and education should only encourage that natural development, but
education is inherently led by adults who have already been somewhat corrupted by their
experience in society.
Rousseau’s focus on promoting man’s natural goodness is also made somewhat
problematic by his commitment to ideals of freedom and democracy, prominent topics in
Rousseau’s social climate (which included the French Revolution). After all, in the
natural world there are inherent hierarchies in which the freedom of some creatures is
limited by their inherent weakness compared to other creatures. Rousseau (1918) applies
this same principle to people, arguing that all should “keep to your appointed place in the
order of nature” (p. 83) to be happy, and that true freedom comes when people are able to
realize and live within their own limitations. In Rousseau’s (1918) words, “that man is
truly free who desires what he is able to perform, and does what he desires” (p. 84), not
aspiring to anything beyond that. Man’s strength comes in part from contentedness within
himself, and weakness comes when man strives to do or be more than he can be (p. 81).
This tension between human freedom and natural social harmony is another paradox
within Rousseau’s philosophy of education.
Rousseau’s philosophy has several inherent strengths—recognitions of complexities
within education that had not been recognized before. For example, Rousseau is the first
to recognize that childhood involves several distinct stages, such as infancy, middle
childhood (the age from around 3 and 12), and adolescence—indeed, Rousseau’s book is
structured around these various stages. While some of his claims regarding specific childrearing practices at certain ages may seem odd or counterintuitive by contemporary
standards (e.g. the notion that swaddling is a form of bondage that inhibits children’s
growth [Rousseau 1918, p. 45]), the simple recognition that child development should be
divided into separate stages requiring different strategic approaches to instruction had not
occurred before Rousseau and set the stage for important child development thinkers like
Jean Piaget.
Rousseau’s focus on the individual, as well as education’s role in promoting a full
human experience, is another strength I draw of his work. To Rousseau (1918), the
purpose of education is the “true study…of the human condition” (p. 42) and the
development of individual people’s strengths so that they can realize the extent of their
potential. Indeed, to Rousseau “the man who has lived the most is not he who has counted

46

Intersections: Critical Issues in Education
2019, Vol. 3, No. 1

the most years but he who has most felt life” (p. 42). This development of individual
potential is what allows for true freedom—granted, Rousseau’s focus on nature allows
this discussion of individual potential to take a somewhat Darwinian perspective in which
some people will be naturally stronger or more able than others, but his focus on the
individual and the role of the individual in promoting freedom and realizing a full human
experience is nonetheless groundbreaking for its time.
In sum, I draw from Rousseau three generative themes–the value of nature; the
significance of freedom and the individual; and the recognition of different stages of
childhood development. As for the role of nature, Rousseau repeatedly and powerfully
asserts the natural goodness of man and the importance of nurturing rather than stunting
man’s natural abilities. For Rousseau, the degradation of nature impacts man’s freedom
and individuality, since Rousseau is intimately concerned with how the social structures
of his time impinged on man’s natural abilities and potential (though, as noted, this
emphasis comes occasionally into tension with Rousseau’s focus on the natural order of
things, including differentiation between stronger and weaker men). Finally, Rousseau
demonstrates how children’s education must align their cognitive development and
provides an extensive analysis of how different stages of a child’s growth required
different approaches to a child’s education.
As Rousseau is understandably a product of his time, many of the limitations of his
work may be relatively low-hanging fruit in a contemporary academic climate. Especially
given the sexist, classist and racist nature of his social environment, his work should be
looked upon charitably to the degree that it does not address education for women, lowincome communities or communities of color. However, those gaps are nonetheless
limitations of his work, which future thinkers will happily fill in.

Wollstonecraft
The first educational philosopher I read who seriously questioned some of these gaps
was Mary Wollstonecraft, who cogently and powerfully addresses the neglect for
education of women in the work of Rousseau and other Enlightenment age thinkers.
Wollstonecraft’s basic argument is simple: in her contemporary world, the only reason
that women are not men’s equal is because they are not given the same opportunities to
become educated and develop their intellectual abilities and reason. In Wollstonecraft’s
(1891) mind, this can be easily fixed: “let woman share the rights, and she will emulate
the virtues of man” (p. 287).
Like Rousseau, Wollstonecraft’s work is very much a product of the Enlightenment.
Her argument is an appeal to man’s reason, and to basic Enlightenment principles of
equality and progress. Women have the same potential as men to develop rationally and
intellectually, but they are not given the same educational opportunities. In the name of
equality and fairness, this should be rectified. It is a powerful, if simple, argument.
Indeed, Wollstonecraft’s (1891) argument is phrased almost as a challenge to the men of
her age: if men feel that women shouldn’t be educated, they should “prove first, to ward
off the charge of injustice and inconsistency, that they [i.e. women] want reason” (p. 5).
This argument is couched in conciliatory language, which states that women do not “have
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sufficient strength of mind to acquire what really deserves the name of virtue”
(Wollstonecraft 1891, p. 19), and that “from the constitution of their bodies, men seem to
be designed by Providence to attain a greater degree of virtue” (Wollstonecraft 1891, p.
28). However, especially given Wollstonecraft’s time period and social world, this can
perhaps be recognized as a political necessity on Wollstonecraft’s part—that is, she
recognizes that her message will not be heard at all if men in power are not given some
recognition of their goodness and supposed superiority.
Given all that, it is interesting that Wollstonecraft’s (1891) contemporaries give
significant resistance to this piece, as she is very careful to couch her revolutionary claims
regarding gender equality in very male-hegemonic terms, asserting that women are
weaker than men both “in point of strength” (p. 8), or speaking physically, as well as with
regards to reason (p. 28). Though Wollstonecraft (1891) makes the strong claim that
women, like men, are endowed with reason, she also takes great pains to “frankly
[acknowledge] the inferiority of woman” (p. 37). Perhaps, in addition to being a
conscious political move on Wollstonecraft’s part, this also serves as an example of the
power of hegemonic thinking. In other words, perhaps even a woman like Wollstonecraft,
committed as she is to the cause of female equality in education, cannot help but be
influenced by the dominant sexual mores of her time.
Despite these concessions of Wollstonecraft’s that somewhat undercut her primary
argument regarding the need for women’s education, her work is a classic of feminist
literature, a powerful statement regarding the equality of men and women when it comes
to potential intellectual development. Wollstonecraft’s work is also powerful due to its
recognition of gender as a social construction. Wollstonecraft (1891) is careful to assert
that female inferiority is learned rather than innate, something “women are told from
infancy” (p. 49) so that men can keep women “in a state of childhood” (p. 50). In this
sense, Wollstonecraft (1891) believes that a woman is “a voluntary slave” (p. 59),
meaning that she has the potential within her to break the bonds of gender inequality
through her own personal intellectual improvement and betterment. Wollstonecraft (1891)
insists that women are “rational creatures” (p. 9) and should be treated as such.
Wollstonecraft’s argument for women’s education is predicated upon several key
principles: first, education cultivates reason, which enables a person to acquire virtue. As
“every being may become virtuous by the exercise of its own reason” (Wollstonecraft
1891, p. 52), including women, women deserve access to education to make this selfimprovement possible. Second, education will allow women to cultivate their natural
faculties (like Rousseau, Wollstonecraft believed strongly in the natural abilities and
potential of human beings) and an independent mind, so that they are not dependent on
men or husbands to make decisions for them (see Wollstonecraft 1891, p. 66). Lastly,
education will allow women to prove their equality, so long as they are given equal
opportunity—“strengthen the female mind by enlarging it, and there will be an end to
blind obedience [to men]” (Wollstonecraft 1891, p. 56).
In summary, the primary generative theme I personally drew from Wollstonecraft’s
work is the importance of always taking gender and the rights of women into
consideration. While this is a principle, I have also taken away from reading the work of
Judith Butler (1990), Patricia Hill Collins (2000) and Virginia Woolf (1927), the elegant
simplicity of Wollstonecraft’s arguments has remained with me. To Wollstonecraft,
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women are equal in potential and thus deserving of equal opportunity when it comes to
education. Though this basic principle may seem self-evident in the 21st century, it indeed
represents a “revolution” (p. 284) in Wollstonecraft’s (1891) day, and her forward
thinking and stalwart commitment to her ideals in the face of opposition deserve the
highest praise.
However, Wollstonecraft’s work does have aspects that are problematic. As mentioned
before, Wollstonecraft occasionally makes statements that seem to imply her own
acquiescence to “natural” male superiority. It is unclear whether such statements are a
conscious political concession on her part, the unconscious reflection of her own
acceptance of hegemonic gender norms, or both. However, such statements do not negate
the power of her overall message regarding inherent and natural equality of intellectual
potential between men and women.
Despite her commitment to women’s rights, Wollstonecraft also has blind spots to
other marginalized communities. Much like Rousseau, Wollstonecraft does not address
issues of social class (like Dorothy Day [1948] and other twentieth century feminists who
follow her), and most of her specific criticisms of women’s education pertain only to the
education of the upper classes (e.g. reading of romance novels and so forth).
Wollstonecraft also does not address issues of inequality based on race. While it would be
easy to attribute such problems to the time and place in which she lived, it is important to
note that some critical race theorists, like Zeus Leonardo (2015) and Ricky Lee Allen
(2008) would disagree, as white abolitionists existed in both the U.S. and Britain during
the 1800s.

Dewey
John Dewey (1921) addresses one of these missing pieces through his focus on public
education for all, including children of lower social classes and children of immigrants.
This inclusion of all within education is central for Dewey because of his view of
education as a means of promoting social cohesion and citizenship. For societies to thrive,
there must be structures that pass on “the life of the group” (Dewey 1921, p. 3), which
includes social norms and culture, as well as means of subsistence. Education in this sense
is one of the primary means whereby the norms and practices of a given society are
passed on from generation to generation. As Dewey (1921) states, “society not only
continues to exist by transmission, by communication, but it may fairly be said to exist in
transmission, in communication” (p. 5). Only through the communication of norms from
generation to generation does society continue to exist. Schools play a crucial role in this
process.
Dewey’s focus on the socially reproductive nature of school seems remarkably like the
focus of early anthropologists like Edward Tylor (1871), Lewis Morgan (1871), Claude
Lévi-Strauss (1955) and so forth on social reproduction, as well as the work of early
sociologists like Emile Durkheim (1893). Indeed, Dewey’s (1921) descriptions of the
“deliberate effort” made to pass on the “ideas and practices” which make possible the
“constant reweaving of the social fabric” (p. 3-4) makes clear the social construction of
knowledge and culture in a way that seems revolutionary given Dewey’s prominence
before the rise of postmodernism and poststructuralism.
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To Dewey, this socially reproductive nature of schooling is crucial for the promotion
of democracy. Dewey disagrees with Rousseau’s assertion that education should promote
what is natural in children; rather, Dewey (1921) sees “the natural or native impulses of
the young” as something that should be “directed or guided” to be more in accordance
with the social norms of their surrounding culture (p. 47). Through this education in social
norms, individuals gain “a personal interest in social relationships and control” (Dewey
1921, p. 115), and this interest gives them reason to want to participate in democratic
political institutions.
However, Dewey recognizes that education does not only take place within schools.
To Dewey, all social life is educational. Education is “a continuous reconstruction of
experience” (Dewey 1921, p. 93), and as knowledge is experiential, all social experience
leads to greater knowledge. This will resonate strongly with Freire and his rejection of
“banking education” (Freire, 2005, pp. 71-72) or education which divorces ideas and
principles taught in school from their connection with the daily realities of students.
In sum, the generative themes I draw from Dewey’s work are social reproduction (as
all societies must reproduce their basic beliefs and culture to continue to exist), public
education (as all students deserve and need access to education to participate fully in
society), and democracy (as schooling gives students the skills they need to fully
participate in representative democracy). With his emphasis on these themes, Dewey
addresses the need for universal education. His recognition of the inequality of previous
forms of education (that is, the private education available only to upper classes in the age
of Rousseau and Wollstonecraft) is a landmark shift, one that will only be taken further by
thinkers such as Du Bois and Freire. Indeed, there is a need for these thinkers to take this
further, as Dewey’s thought, while very progressive for its time, does not address
inequalities on the basis of gender or race, and also does not recognize the full extent to
which schooling is inherently unequal for the oppressed lower classes. Indeed, some of
the principles of public education that Dewey most fully lauds (such as its socially
reproductive function) will be questioned by critical theorists in the late twentieth century,
as scholars like Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron (1977), Paul Willis (1978), and
Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (1976) point out that schools reproduce not only
beliefs and culture for social cohesion, but patterns of inequality as low-income students
are taught to maintain their social station rather than question or push against it.

Du Bois and Morrison
The primary contribution of W.E.B. Du Bois to my educational philosophy is direct
and simple: to be fair and equal, education must recognize inequalities which exist in
society on the basis of race. In The Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois (1903) famously states
that “the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line” (p. 13). That
is, all lived experience, including access to education, differs extensively for white people
and people of color. As such, the generative theme of Du Bois’ work might most
accurately be stated as being race—more specifically, recognizing how inherent and
ingrained inequalities in Western society play out on the basis of racial stratification.
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Personally, the social theorizing of figures like Du Bois regarding race had a more
impact on my thinking through literary figures like Alice Walker (1982), Lorraine
Hansberry (1959), Ralph Ellison (1952), Langston Hughes (2001), and as I will discuss
hereafter, Toni Morrison (1970). I argue that these writers have made a prominent
contribution to how philosophies of education affect communities of color through the
expansive social reach of their writing, which has gone well beyond the reach of most
academic theorizing. The contribution of women of color like Morrison is especially
important to highlight, as it recognizes a prominent blind spot of previous thinkers,
including Du Bois—that is, the unique experience of women of color. While
Wollstonecraft argues eloquently for the inclusion of women in education, due to the time
and place of her writing this plea does not include women of color. Similarly, though Du
Bois makes a powerful contribution to the political dialogue regarding racism in the
United States and throughout the West, his primary concern is with civil and other rights
for black men—black women, and other women of color, remained quite marginalized in
Du Bois’ contemporary discourse surrounding education.
Morrison’s work is perhaps most touching in its recognition of the acceptance of
racial hegemony on the part of children of color, something which many educational
theorists do not address. In The Bluest Eye, the main character Pecola idolizes the white
child actress Shirley Temple, wishing that she could especially have the beautiful blue
eyes of that actress and everything they represent in terms of social position and
acceptance (Morrison, 1970, pp. 46-47). The complicated racial politics of the black
community are discussed in powerful nuance throughout the novel, as other black
characters with intentions for upward mobility and lighter complexions (like Geraldine)
consider themselves above characters like Pecola, referring to her as a “nasty little black
bitch” (Morrison 1970, p. 92). The acceptance of implied white superiority, and the
complicated identity and community politics that this implies within communities of
color, only makes the enfranchisement of communities of color in education (which as an
institution is also inherently deferential to and based upon white cultural norms) even
more complicated. Though not specifically a work intended for use in the philosophy of
education, Morrison’s The Bluest Eye highlighted for me the need to recognize not only
racial inequality in education, but the intersections between inequality on the basis of race
and gender which play out daily in the school lives of children of color.

Freire
Paulo Freire’s work fills a unique gap in my philosophy of education as it is one of the
first seminal texts in the field to come from the developing world, and as such it
represents an intimate knowledge of the way in which class oppression plays out
especially severely for disenfranchised low-income communities in developing countries.
To make clear the point that society is inherently unequal, Freire uses very unequivocal
language to describe how society is divided between those who are oppressed and those
who are oppressors, the latter drawing their social power from their ability to maintain
dominance over the former. The oppressive classes of society objectify and domesticate
(Freire 2005, p. 51) the oppressed classes to maintain their place in the hegemonic power
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structure. As Freire (2005) states, “the oppressor consciousness tends to transform
everything surrounding it into an object of its domination” (p. 58).
With specific regard to schooling, Freire classifies education as oppressive insomuch
that students (especially marginalized students) are objectified through their participation
in schools. Freire (2005) describes the method used for this objectification as “banking
education,” a school model in which students are seen as empty receptacles to be “filled”
with knowledge by teachers (pp. 71-72), and a student is seen as “good” if they passively
and meekly receive what they are given (p. 73).
One element of Freire’s philosophy hearkens back to that of Rousseau, in that he sees
education as an essential element of humanization. To Rousseau (1918), education is
successful when it leads participants to feel life strongly and live life the fullest (p. 42). To
Freire (2005), the entire purpose of education is, especially for the marginalized and
oppressed who have been objectified and dehumanized by school and society, to “become
more fully human” (p. 68). However, to reach full humanization in a Freirean sense, it is
not enough to recognize the resilience and strength of marginalized groups: truly
revolutionary education must be both emancipatory and humanizing in its very nature.
This is achievable if teachers consciously remember to treat their students as cocreators of knowledge and educational practice, rather than as “subjects of investigation”
(Freire 2005, p. 107). To accomplish this, students should take an active part in curricular
design, from the identification of the basic themes of instruction to the construction of the
actual pedagogical practices used to address and explore these themes (see Freire 2005, p.
108-115). This participatory pedagogy becomes what Freire (2005) terms as praxis, or
reflection combined with action, with a conscious aim to do so for the purpose of social
transformation (p. 51). Only through such praxis can individuals reach full humanity;
divorced from application, knowledge returns to its previous banal and flavorless state,
becoming a meaningless collection of dates and trivia that has no use beyond
memorization and regurgitation. Knowledge, when seen through a lens that recognizes its
transformative potential, is the root of all meaningful social action. When knowledge is
truly created, through a pedagogical process that involves meaningful interaction with and
reflection upon one’s circumstances, then education truly becomes liberating. As Freire
(2005) states, “liberating education consists in acts of cognition, not transferrals of
information” (p. 79).
The first action that must be taken to achieve Freirean social transformation is an act
that is deeply personal: one must learn to “name the world” (Freire 2005, p. 88), or be
able to identify the elements of structural oppression in one’s personal and professional
experience. It is from that point of naming that one can move forward and pursue social
change. This process of learning to name one’s experience with oppression and pain is a
necessary first step towards seeking social change—indeed, “to speak a true word is to
transform the world” (Freire 2005, p. 87). This is so because through this process, one
gains an increased sense of self-efficacy that makes social change seem not only possible,
but plausible. As Freire (2005) states, “people to come to feel like masters of their
thinking by discussing the thinking and views of the world explicitly or implicitly
manifest in their own suggestions and those of their comrades” (p. 124). This is the
process of reflection that makes up the crucial first part of praxis. That reflection brings
forth not only concrete recognition of structural inequalities, but also promotes critical
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thinking that stimulates creative and innovative potential responses to such inequality, and
thus leads to action towards concrete goals. The end goal of this process for a Freirean
educator is that “the thematics which have come from the people return to them—not as
contents to be deposited, but as problems to be solved” (Freire 2005, p. 123).
All of these pedagogical principles have one primary purpose in mind—that is,
education in a Freirean context leads students to liberation. This is perhaps the most
fitting generative theme of Freire’s work: liberation through education. As students learn
through critical pedagogy that they can be subjects instead of objects, and not only
recognize inequality in their own lives but challenge it, widespread social transformation
becomes not only a utopian possibility, but a true potential reality.

hooks
However, while Freire’s work is a powerful treatise on the effects of oppression, it
neglects to “name” several of the most prominent forms of oppression, especially
oppression based on gender and race. bell hooks (1994), perhaps one of the most
prominent followers of Paulo Freire, addresses these blind spots in her own construction
of “engaged pedagogy,” which draws heavily from feminist literature as well as Paulo
Freire’s construction of critical pedagogy. As hooks (1994) states, “‘engaged pedagogy’ is
more demanding than conventional critical or feminist pedagogy” in that “it emphasizes
well-being,” meaning that students of all backgrounds (including all potential variations
of race, gender, class and sexuality) must be recognized as “fully human” and encouraged
in their own personal processes of what hooks terms “self-actualization,” a construction
which in hooks’ usage closely parallels Freire’s notion of “critical consciousness” (p. 15).
Freire’s critical pedagogy provides a clear and powerful model wherein marginalized
students can be led to recognize their own potential self-efficacy, while hooks’ (1994)
engaged pedagogy takes this model and makes it even more inclusive and personal by
overtly centering the ways in which Freire’s model of critical pedagogy can overlook
injustices perpetuated on the basis of race and gender.

Harmonizing a Philosophy of Education
All of these thinkers contribute elements which I have shaped into my own philosophy
of education. From Rousseau, it is important to note that education should be tailored to
fit the various stages of a child’s development, and should recognize the fact that children
are born with certain innate strengths granted them by nature. Education should seek to
magnify and enhance these natural talents if students are to reach their full potential.
From Wollstonecraft comes recognition that this natural ability to develop reason is
not limited to men; rather, women have just as much innate potential for selfimprovement through education as men, if they are allowed to pursue such. Du Bois (and
literary figures like Morrison) bring the important acknowledgment that this innate
potential within people extends to communities of color as well, and especially to
communities (like women of color) that experience intersections of marginality based on
race, gender, and/or sexuality.
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From Dewey comes the affirmation that education is a right to which all are endowed,
and that education (by its nature) is an inherently socially reproductive act. From Freire
and hooks comes recognition that this social reproduction is not always positive—rather,
schooling is one tool used by those in power to maintain their power and keep
marginalized communities in their place. However, Freire and hooks also provide a
pedagogical model that can subvert hegemonic social reproduction in education, leading
students to recognize their own self-efficacy in the face of inequality and work towards
transformative social change.
Perhaps most importantly, Freire and hooks provide a powerful model of how
educators can move forward reflectively, recognizing that there are likely still many
innovations in education yet to be made and blind spots yet to be recognized. In Teaching
to Transgress, hooks (1994) discusses her own interactions with Paulo Freire, and how
when confronted with his own failures to recognize sexism in his work, Freire was a
“generous spirit” (pp. 54-55) that was willing to recognize those shortcomings, asserting
that hooks (1994) and other philosophers could build upon his thought and make it much
more than Freire was able to make of it himself. Indeed, hooks (1994) asserts that Paul
Freire “[embodies] the [self-reflective] practice he describes in theory” when he discusses
the importance of praxis (p. 56). As every thinker’s contributions to the field are similarly
human and short-sighted, I can only work towards the goal of my own work being
similarly self-reflective, willing to recognize when my philosophical models are
insufficient and have room for improvement.
It is important to note that the scholars and writers presented here are far from an
exhaustive list of those who have shaped my educational philosophy. Using Freire’s
(2005) generative themes as a literary device here has been helpful, but is also inherently
limiting, as a focus upon individual scholars to represent educational philosophy
surrounding gender, race, and social class means many personally meaningful names go
unmentioned and impactful bodies of work go unexplored—important names like Gloria
Anzaldúa (1987), Audre Lorde (1984), Miles Horton (1998), and Malcolm X (1965).
However, both those explored in this text and those mentioned here have contributed to a
personal philosophy of education that I view at its root as focused upon humanity—that is,
the affirmation of the full humanity and equality of all students and educators, and the
recognition that the educational process can (and should) be a means of recognizing and
expanding that humanity. As a cisgender white man raised speaking English by two
upper-middle-class academics, I have always lived in a world and been educated in
schools that have recognized my humanity and encouraged me personally to “become
more fully human” (Freire, 2005, p. 68). The thinkers I have discussed here are those who
have helped me to recognize that the same has not been true for students and children
whose identities are different from mine on the basis of race, gender and social class—
especially for those (like Toni Morrison) who grew up being marginalized on multiple
intersecting axes of social difference. Given the fact that the majority of our nation’s
educators and administrators continue to not reflect the identities or backgrounds of the
students they serve (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013), I share this piece to model a jumping-off
point for reflection among similarly positioned colleagues with whom I work and whom I
teach.
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